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Territorialization, Resistance and 
the Mirage of Permanent Boundaries 




Internal territorialization is described as the attempt to circumscribe the use of various resources, such 
as land and forests, within the boundaries of a nation-state. This translates into the creation of property 
rights for different social actors and the demarcation of a physical sphere wherein such rights could be 
exercised. The notion of permanent boundaries around forests, where local people lack property rights, is 
popular with all arms of the state, everywhere. 
This paper traces the first attempts by the colonial state in the Indian Western Himalayas to draw 
boundaries around forests and define the rights of local populations. The process, which intensified with 
the publication of a Forest Department report in 1876, was fraught with obstacles at several levels through-
out its course. It met sustained resistance from the peasants, who fought restrictions on their use of the 
forests. More importantly, horizontal tensions across different departments and vertical tensions between 
local knowledge professed by provincial bureaucracy on the one hand, and central direction emanating 
from the scientific establishment around forest management on the other, frustrated any attempt at unifor-
mity in state responses. All these factors worked in tandem over the last quarter of the 19'11 century in Kulu 
sub-division, a site saliently embedded in the emerging political economy as seen in expanding canal 
irrigation in the Punjab as well as rising demand for the prized timber abundant in Kulu . 
I argue that the project to create permanent boundaries around forests was never accomplished in 
Kulu, with the Forest Settlement Report of 1897 failing both to keep the people out of forests and to 
bridge intra-state divisions. This triumvirate of mutual tensions-local resistance, local knowledge, and 
central direction-was instrumental in constituting the 'state' and proved to be the salient feature of later 
state-society interactions. 
Introduction 
In the summer of 1999, approximately 750 square ki-
lometers of territory in the western Himalayas, in the dis-
trict of Kullu in the northern Indian state of Himachal 
Pradesh, was declared closed to local populations and no-
tified (officially designated) as the Great Himalayan Na-
tional Park. Following the procedure laid down in the In-
dian Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, the rights of any 
claimants to the resources inside the Park were extin-
guished; out of the more than 15,000 users, a small com-
pensation was ordered for those whose names app,eared in 
the records that were consulted by the powers-that-be to 
determine legitimate users. Curiously, this legitimacy was 
derived from records more than a century old, of 1897 vin-
tage, from the first forest settlement in the region that de-
marcated almost the whole area into different classes of 
forests and determined and codified the nature and extent 
of rights in all of these forests. 
The notification of the National Park appeared to cul-
minate a 15-year struggle of the Forest Department and 
the conservation lobby in India to secure the area for the 
conservation of precious western Himalayan biological di-
versity in general. However, events beginning in the fol -
lowing summer and autumn and continuing until the au-
tumn of 2001 illuminated the difficulty of calling an end to 
the problem. Immediately following the notification and 
the extinguishing of rights, local populations organized 
themselves to lobby their political representatives for re-
dress . Through a combination of moral economy, feisty in-
solence, and electoral arithmetic, local populations were 
successful in securing access to the legally denied resources 
inside the Park, circumventing the restrictions and threats 
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posed by the Forest Department and the law. 
Examples of successful resistance by local cornrnunj-
ties to state efforts at exclusion are common across the non-
developed world. What this paper attempts to accomplish 
is to situate the events in the Great Himalayan National 
Park within the larger political ecology and environmental 
history of the region and provide a historical context to the 
resistance. I argue that the events of 1999 in the Great Hi-
malayan National Park were preconfigured in significant 
ways by the history of territorialization through legal cat-
egories witnessed in the region and by the state-society 
relationship that evolved as a consequence of this history. 
The process in Kullu fur thers our understanding of ten·ito-
rialization and the diverse ways in which interaction of state 
and social actors at the disaggregated level influences the 
outcomes . 
Territorialization and its troubled relationsh ip to 
resistance 
Ramachandra Guha has argued that the Indian colonial 
state, spurred by the rising demand for timber and the pros-
pect of running out of supplies, appropriated large tracts of 
'wastes' and classified these as state forests. This process, 
which began in the mid-nineteenth century, resulted in wide-
spread dispossession of rural communities heavily depen-
dent on forests for subsistence. The Indian Forest Act of 
1878, the sequel to the much milder statute of 1865, pro-
vided the state with the necessary teeth to accomplish this 
takeover, through classification of forests into neat catego-
ries.1 The changeover to total state control of forests within 
a few decades has been termed a watershed in defining the 
state-society relationship around forests in colonial India. 
Elsewhere, Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso have ar-
gued that such internal territorialization, understood as al-
location of property rights in land and a determination of 
resource-use patterns set within a totalitarian bureaucratic 
framework and embedded in a spatial grid within the bound-
aries of a nation-state, has progressed linearly through three 
phases. In the first phase, the state asserts its ownership of 
all unoccupied lands, particularly forests, and codifies titles 
and property rights. Thereafter, it proceeds to curtail re-
source-use through a legal classification of forest lands, 
earmarked as permanent forests, unavailable for appropria-
tion for cultivation. Finally, the forests are reclassified ac-
cording to scientific categories-soils, watershed regimes, 
wildlife, etc .-further eroding user rights of local popula-
tions? 
1 Ramachandra Guha, 'Forestry in British and Post British 
India :An Historical Analysis', Economic and Political Weekly, 
vol. XVII, 1983, pp 1882-96. 
2 Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso, 'Territmialization and 
state power in Thailand', Theory and Society, 24:3, June 1995, 
pp 385-426. 
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State po licies of exclusion have often been thwarted 
from within, particularly because of the conflicting and 
sometimes contradictory interests and responsibilities of 
competing arms of the state. Thus, the Revenue Depart-
ment in colonial India has been characterized as resisting 
the predatory designs of the Forest Department. Even within 
the colonial Forest Department, there appear to be differ-
ent positions with respect to the best course of action . Be-
tween the annexationist, pragmatic, and populist positions, 
the particular thrust of the Indian Forest Act of 1878 is 
seen as evidence of the victory of the annexationist school 
of thought and the end of the debate. 3 Other scholars have 
challenged this portrayal of an unalloyed victory for the 
hawks . Saberwal traces the history of interdepartmental 
conflict and rivalry well past the colorual period and as-
serts that the Forest Department never succeeded in fully 
realizing its avowed control over teJTitory and was suc-
cessfully thwarted by the revenue department in the colo-
nial period and by elected representatives in the post-colo-
nial period.4 Sivaramakrishnan contradicts the notion of a 
unified and centralized state with perfect and total com-
mand over its territories . In documenting the process in 
colonial eastern India, he highlights the tension between 
local authority and central direction and argues that the 
centralized body of knowledge that passed for scientific 
forestry was disputed by local officials in Bengal, result-
ing in a 'limited conservancy' within the parameters de-
cided locally.5 Vandergeest and Peluso, speaking for Thai-
land, argue that the project of territorialization is ultimately 
unsuccessful, as a result of continued peasant resistance.6 
That local populations resist the processes of territori-
alization is beyond qualification. In the Indian case, Gadgil 
and Guha have documented the numerous and continuous 
peasant and tribal revolts that can be traced directly to the 
state-sponsored curtailment of forest use consequent to 
appropriation.7 Both Sivaramakrishnan8 and Vandergeest 
3 Ramachandra Guha, 'An early environmental debate : The 
making of the 1878 forest act', Indian Economic and Social His-
tory Review, vol. XXVII, 1990, pp 65-84. 
4 Vasant Saberwal, Pastoral Politics: Bureaucrats, Shepherds 
and Conservation in the Western Himalaya, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
5 K. Sivaramakrishnan, 'A Hmited forest conservancy in south-
west Bengal, 1864-1912', Journal of Asian Studies, 56: I, Febru-
ary 1997, pp75-112. 
6 Vandergeest and Peluso, Op cit. pp 412 
7 Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil, 'State Forestry 
and social conflict in British India', Past and Present, 123, May 
1989, pp 141-177; Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This 
fissured land: An ecological hlstory oflndia, Deihl, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1992. 
• K. Sivaramakrishnan, Modern Forests : Statemaking and 
Environmental change in colonial eastern India, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999. 
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and Peluso9 attribute some agency to peasant and tribal 
populations that are affected directly, in deflecting the threat 
of centralized control and restrictions. All seem to be in 
agreement that territorialization, unsuccessful and limited 
as the case may be, does proceed through legal categories 
such as reserved and protected forests, wildlife sanctuar-
ies, and national parks. 
It is precisely at this crossroads of territorialization and 
resistance, as well as through interdepartmental conflicts 
and center/local tensions, that the issues can be probed fur-
ther to get at the nuances of the project of territorialization. 
The history of territorialization in Kullu subdivision of 
Kangra district in nineteenth century Punjab provides us 
with such a unique glimpse of the colonial state in India at 
a historical moment. 10 
The significance of Kullu 
Kullu is comprised almost entirely of the upper catch-
ment of the river Beas, an important tributary of the Indus 
in the western Himalayas. It was annexed by the British in 
1849, followed by the first revenue settlement in 1852. The 
settlement was cursory and represented the first phase of 
territorialization; all unoccupied lands were declared to be 
state property. Forest conservancy did not begin in any se-
riousness unti11868 when twenty-six blocks of forest were 
demarcated and transferred to the newly formed and thinly 
manned Forest Department. The demand for timber to meet 
the expansion of civil and military infrastructure in Punjab 
was initially met from forests in the jurisdiction of local 
tributary states such as Chamba and Bashahar through log-
ging leases. 11 By the end of the 1870s, however, there was 
an acute awareness of an impending shortfall of supplies 
and the unreliability of tributary states in enforcing strict 
conservancy. It was also the time of the expansion of the 
expansive canal iiTigation systems and the railways in the 
plains of Punjab, with the likely prospect of a widening 
gulf between the demand and supply of quality timber. 12 
Kullu was the only area under British administration 
with large and contiguous forests of the Himalayan cedar, 
the timber of choice of the Forest Department, within easy 
• Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995. 
1° Kullu, the territory now known as Kullu District in the 
state of Himachal Pradesh, was a sub-division in the district 
Kangra in Punjab province during the period under discussion . It 
was merged with Himachal Pradesh in 1966. 
11 Mahesh Rangarajan, 'Imperial Agendas and India's For-
ests: The early history of Indian forestry, 1800-1878', Indian 
Economic and Social History Review, vol. XXXI, 1994, pp 147-
167. 
12 lndu Agnihotri, 'Ecology, Landuse and Colonization: The 
canal colonies of Punjab', Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, vol. 33: I, 1996, pp 37-58. 
reach of the substantial perennial rivers required to trans-
port the timber. By 1870, senior bureaucrats were convinced 
that the forest wealth of Kullu needed to be managed sci-
entifically to ensure sustained yields. In 1876, three forest 
offi.cials-Dietrich Brandis, the Inspector General ofFor-
ests,13 B . H. Baden Powell, Conservator of Forests, Punjab, 
and Lt. Col. Stenhouse, Deputy Conservator of Forests, 
Kangra district-surveyed the area and provided detailed 
suggestions for the demarcation of the best forests in Kullu. 
They estimated that of the total area of approximately 1,200 
square miles, only about 400 could be said to be under 
forest. 14 In their report, they suggested that about 150 square 
miles be demarcated and subsequently managed for tim-
ber production. They also emphasized the need to separate 
forests to be made available for the expansion of cultiva-
tion from those to be maintained permanently as forests. 
The report met with universal approval within the colonial 
bureaucracy; revenue and forest officials alike responded 
enthusiastically to the proposed demarcations. Over the next 
two decades, however, actors at the local, provincial, and 
national levels interpreted the report differently in the light 
of the brand new Indian Forest Act of 1878. The legal cat-
egories were deliberated, interpretations were disputed, and 
fault lines emerged within the state apparatus as Kullu 
emerged as a 'zone of anomaly'; a strict application of the 
legal categories prescribed in the 1878 law was thwarted 
by the provincial Revenue Department through a charac-
terization of Kullu as anomalous. 15 Besides the Forest De-
13 The nomenclature of colonial bureaucracy is liberally 
sprinkled all over tllis paper. It will be useful at tllis stage to pro-
vide a brief introduction. Territories below the provincial level 
(e.g. Punjab) were Division (as in Jullunder Division), District 
(as in Kangra), and Sub-division (as in Kullu). At each level, the 
corresponding Revenue Department Officials were Financial 
Comnlissioner (Provincial), Comnlissioner and Superintendent 
(Divisional), Deputy Comnlissioner (District) and Assistant Corn-
missioner (Sub-division) . Above all these was Secretary to the 
Government of Punjab (usually in charge of Revenue, Agricul-
ture and Forests) and the Secretary to the Government of India. 
The Forest Department was organized in parallel to this struc-
ture. The basic unit was the Forest Division (such as Beas Divi-
sion, under wllich Kullu fell), which was much smaller than the 
Revenue Department Division. At the Forest Division level, was 
the Deputy Conservator of Forests. Above tllis was the Conser-
vator of Forests at the Provincial level (Punjab). The top official 
in the Forest Department was the Inspector General of Forests, in 
charge of the whole country. 
14 This ratio of forests to total area is not unusual in Kullu . 
Even in the Great Himalayan National Park, only a third of the 
area is under forest, the rest being equally divided between per-
manent snow and rocks above the line of possible life, and the 
expansive alpine meadows above the line of tree grmvth and be-
low the permanent snow. 
15 Sivaramakrishnan has used the term zones of anomaly in 
describing 'geographic spaces in the teiTain targeted by the Per-
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partment-Revenue Department axis, there emerged a strong 
local bureaucratic response to central direction, in interac-
tion with the resistance of the local populations ·to the new 
and proposed restrictions. As the debate moved from an 
inter-departmental conflict, through the center-local ten-
sions, to the formulation of a compromise, overt peasant 
resistance in the late 1880s once again foiled attempts to 
implement and enforce the new detente. 
This paper argues that the debate concerning demarca-
tion of forests in Kullu could be characterized as between 
intensive and extensive territorialization, rather than be-
tween annexationists and pragmatists or populists. The in-
tensive territorialization position demanded a focus on de-
marcating a small area of productive forests, with 'full 
ownership' of the state (and management control of the 
Forest Department) and no meddlesome rights of local 
populations, leaving the rest in loose control of the Rev-
enue Department and managed with the help of local no-
tables. The extensive territorialization position entailed a 
demarcation of all forest land as state property and man-
aged as forests with a hierarchy of rights and privileges for 
the local populations. Such a distinction allows us to get 
away from the debate amongst forest officials on the In-
dian Forest Act of 1878 and to bring in the perspectives 
and arguments of officers of the Revenue Department, 
which played a major role in interpreting the provisions of 
the Act at the provincial level. 
Secondly, in the compromise that was worked out in 
Kullu, legal categories were re-interpreted in ways that 
defied and sometimes contradicted central direction as rep-
resented by the 1878 law. This compromise was necessar-
ily a middle ground between intensive and extensive posi-
tions and resulted in what I call vertical territorialization. 
In the new arrangement, almost the whole territory ofKullu 
was demarcated, but it was also carefully classified into 
vertically arranged categories that progressively curtailed 
rights of local populations. Interestingly, these new cat-
egories were nested within the classification ordained in 
the central law, while deviating from its salient features in 
significant ways. Vertical territorialization also combined 
the intensive and extensive positions in imaginative dimen-
sions by creating a supra-tenure of reserved species and 
temporally circumscribed rights over the whole territory, 
and most significantly, by creating a vertical pyramid of 
rightholders graded according to ownership of land. 
Thirdly, sustained resistance to new regulations regard-
ing fire, grazing, and timber for local populations thwarted 
state attempts at restrictions and raised question marks 
against the notion of permanent boundaries around · state 
forests, a notion central to the project of territorialization 
and cherished by all arms of the state. Initially, the Rev-
enue Department used this resistance. to strengthen its char-
acterization ofKullu as a zone of anomaly and to rally sup-
18 
port across the departmental divide for the cause of local 
knowledge against central direction. In the end, the resis-
tance of local populations led to a breakdown of local con-
sensus between the Revenue and Forest Departments. 
Finally, this three-way interaction, between central di-
rection, local resistance, and claims to local knowledge, 
defined the contours of the nascent colonial state in Kullu 
and the range and domain of state-society relationships 
around forests, elements of which can be witnessed in the 
events that unfolded in the Great Himalayan National Park 
in 1999. Moreover, vertical territorialization had serious 
consequences for the process of state formation, in the form 
of an enduring configuration of forest rights for vertically 
arranged social actors in vertically organized forest classes. 
The War of Attrition 
The Joint Report by Brandis, Baden-Powell, and 
Stenhouse16 (Joint Report) on the demarcation of forests 
in Kullu was submitted to Government of India in late 1876 
and made its way to provincial officers by the middle of 
1877. It attracted praise for its balanced treatment of the 
subject and was welcomed by all and sundry as the correct 
way to proceed on the vexing forest question. 17 In one of 
the first cautionary notes to the possible implications of 
the Joint Report, James Lyall, senior Revenue Department 
official and the last bureaucrat to have carried out a Rev-
enue Settlement in Kullu in 1875, noted that if the provi-
sions of the report are carried out in a "harsh and unbend-
ing" manner, there may result "much injury and annoy-
ance" to the local population. 18 In a detailed reply, Baden-
Powell, co-author of the report and Conservator of For-
ests, asserted that "unless the reservation ... is undertaken 
it is impossible simply that this department can be respon-
sible, either for the safety of the soil, or the continued sup-
manent Settlement (of 1793) in Bengal wh£re its application was 
thwarted' (K. Sivaramakrishnan 1999 op cit.) . I am deploying the 
term in a broader sense, signifying spaces of resistance within 
the state apparatus created by regional and provincial actors and 
deployed against central direction, by creating an identity that 
was essentially anomalous and therefore not amenable to univer-
sal principles. 
16 D. Brandis, B.H. Baden-Powell and Lieut.-Col. W. 
Stenhouse, Suggestions regarding the Demarcation and Manage-
ment of the Forests in Kullu, 11'h November, 1876, Calcutta, Of-
fice of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1877. 
17 A. Brandreth, C&S, Jullunder Div., to Secy to FC, Punjab, 
No.1935, dated Jullunder, 13'h August 1878, Printed Correspon-
dence of Forests in Kullu , Basta #21, Serial #320, Kangra DC 
Records, Himachal Pradesh State Archives, Shimla (henceforth 
Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla). 
18 E.B. Francis, Offg. Secy. to FC, Punjab, to Secy. to Govt., 
Punjab, No.943, dated Lahore, 21 ''August 1879, Kullu For. Corr., 
HPSA, Shimla. 
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ply of the timber demanded locally, still less for the supply 
of deodar for export." 19 With the Indian Forest Act's ap-
proval in 1878, GOI increased pressure on the provincial 
government to implement the Joint Report under the new 
law. The words used in the report (forest reserves) being 
similar to the most restrictive category of forests in the Law 
(Reserved Forests), it was assumed that the new demarca-
tion would proceed under the same provisions. The 1878 
Act provided for two main categories of forests, Reserved 
and Protected. Chapter II of the law described the provi-
sions regarding Reserved Forests and was considered, then 
and now, to be severe on local rights . Only such acts were 
permitted as were expressly allowed in the particular for-
est. In contrast, Chapter IV, dealing with Protected For-
ests, allowed all acts that were not expressly prohibited in 
the forest. In spite of assurance from forest officers regard-
ing the well-being of local populations and the exercise of 
their rights, the stringent provisions for Reserved Forests 
raised Lyall's doubts. 20 The doubts remained, but the Gov-
ernment of Punjab went ahead and issued a notification in 
December 1880 to undertake the demarcation and settle-
ment of 62 blocks of forests, as given in the Joint Report, 
under the provisions of Chapter II of the Indian Forest ActY 
The issue of rights and the permanence of forests 
As early as February 1881, sharp differences appeared 
between the Settlement Officer, Alexander Anderson, and 
Lt. Col. Stenhouse, Deputy Conservator of Forests, over 
the issue of defining rights. 22 In March 1881, Stenhouse 
wrote to his superiors, complaining of too many rights be-
ing allowed.23 In a swift reply, William Schlich, the offici-
ating Conservator of Forests, Punjab, agreed with Stenhouse 
that the record of rights being prepared by Anderson was 
inadequate to meet the demands of strict conservancy.24 
By May 1881, the Revenue and Forest Departments were 
sharply divided on the desirable course of action. Forest 
19 B.H. Baden-Powell, CF, Punjab, to Secy to FC, Punjab, 
No.115C.L., dated Simla, 3'd September 1878, Kullu For. CoiT., 
HPSA, Shimla. 
20 F. C. Channing, Settlement Secy to FC, Punjab, to Offg. Secy 
to Govt., Punjab, No. 276S, dated Lahore, 24"' March1881, Kullu 
For. CoiT., HPSA, Shimla. 
21 F.D. Cunnigham, Offg. Secy to Govt., Punjab, to Secy to 
FC, Punjab, No. 216F, dated Lahore, 25"' April 1881, Kullu For. 
CoiT., HPSA, Shimla. 
22 A. Anderson, Asst. Comm., Kullu, to DCF, Kullu, No.43, 
dated camp Jagatsukh, 14'h February 1881, Kullu For. Corr., 
HPSA, Shimla. . 
23 Col. W. Stenhouse, DCF, Punjab, Beas Forest Div.,to CF, 
Punjab, No.288C, dated 14th March 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., HPSA, 
Shimla. 
24 W Schlich, CF, Punjab, to DCF, Beas Div., demi-official 
dated camp via Chakrata, 2"d May 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., HPSA, 
Shimla. 
officials were adamant that only full closure of all forests 
suggested in the Joint report as Reserved Forests under the 
India Forest Act could meet the requirements of forest con-
servancy. Revenue officials, right up to the provincial level, 
were convinced that this was unnecessary and would prove 
to be disastrous for the local populations and harm the peace 
and prosperity of the region. One particular characteristic 
was repeatedly highlighted to indicate the anomalous na-
ture of the tract, and hence the difficulty of a strict and full 
closure of the deodar forests. This was that deodar pre-
fened the same gentle slopes that were used by the people 
for cultivation, leading to a patchwork-quilt of villages and 
precious forests. The closure of large deodar forests would 
necessarily inconvenience a disproportionately high num-
ber of people. It was during this deadlock that the blame 
was laid squarely at the altar of Chapter II of the Forest 
Act, pertaining to Reserved Forests and its prerequisite of 
full extinguishment of rights. Colonel Davies, Commis-
sioner of the Jullunder Division, suggested that the provi-
sions of Chapter IV of the Forest Act, pertaining to Pro-
tected Forests, would have been more than sufficient to 
meet the suggestions given in the Joint Report without caus-
ing undue restrictions on the local people.25 Lyall, now the 
Financial Commissioner of Punjab, quickly put his weight 
behind his subordinates and supported the use of Chapter 
IV in dealing with the situation.26 
Forest officials reacted with predictable dismay at the 
proposal. Major Bailey, Conservator of Forests, Punjab, 
asserted that one of the principal objectives of the Joint 
Report was to "secure for the use of the people of the coun-
try as well as for export a sufficient and permanent supply 
of timber and other forest produce" (emphasis in original)Y 
It was argued that "Reserved Forests are the only kind of 
forests that can permanently exist" and that the provisions 
for Protected Forests were far too nebulous to ensure against 
the "growth of private rights" and "prevention of fire." It 
was precisely with a view to the well-being of local people 
and forests that reservation of forests and curtailment of 
rights was desirable. 28 
It was in the context of the war of the chapters that 
Lyall pointed out that "action taken under Chapter II would 
25 Col. W.G. Davies, C&S, Jullunder Div., to Secy to FC, 
Punjab, No.1247, dated Jullunder, 25u' May 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., 
HPSA, Shimla. 
26 F.C.Channing, Secy to FC, Punjab, to CF, Punjab, 
No.129C.S., dated 27"' September 1881, Kullu For. CoiT., HPSA, 
Shimla. 
27 
"Memorandum on the Settlement of rights in Kullu For-
ests, with special reference to Financial Commissioner's No.129, 
dated 27'h September 1881", Major F. Bailey, CF, Punjab, to Secy 
to FC, Punjab, pp 17, Kuilu For. CoiT., HPSA, Shimla. 
28 ibid., pp 19. 
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only affect the demarcated forests." The need of the hour 
was to cover all the forests under the demarcation, which 
could be done only under the provisions of Chapter IV, 
"giving all the power required to preserve the forests, to 
prevent the growth of rights, and to cany out the policy of 
the Joint Report". He recommended that a new notifica-
tion be issued "declaring the provisions of Chapter IV ap-
plicable to all the forest and waste lands."29 This recom-
mendation was accepted, and in April 1882 the Govern-
ment of Punjab reversed its earlier decision to apply Chap-
ter II to limited and designated forests and issued a fresh 
notification proclaiming the application of Chapter IV of 
the Indian Forest Act to all the forests and waste lands of 
Kullu. The project of intensive territorialization, initiated 
by the Forest Department, was transformed by Revenue 
Department officials into extensive territorialization.30 
Central Direction, Local Knowledge 
Brandis, Inspector General of Forests, struck back with 
a detailed memo in July 1882, taking issue with Lyall that 
deodar groves were interlocked everywhere with cultiva-
tion and contending that this was so only in ltmited areas. 
The memo explained in detail his reservations that Pro-
tected Forests constituted under Chapter IV could not pre-
vent the growth of rights and destruction by fires. Clearly 
outlining his program of intensive demarcation, he sug-
gested that in exchange for extinguishing rights in the de-
marcated forests, more rights be allowed in the excluded 
parts. Brandis quoted at length the system that had evolved 
in the nearby and topographically similar region of Jaunsar 
in the neighboring United Provinces, where 142 of a total 
of 400 square miles had been demarcated as Reserved For-
ests. Of the 142, twenty-four had been carved out as first 
class reserves with no rights at all and completely at the 
disposal of the department. The memo proposed that the 
system followed in Jaunsar of dividing the Reserved For-
ests into two classes could be followed in Kullu, whereby 
a small portion could be liberated from rightsY 
29 F. C. Channing, Secy to FC, Punjab, to Secy to Govt., Punjab, 
No.l08, dated Lahore, 11 "'February 1882, Kullu For. Con., HPSA, 
Shimla. 
30 I use the terms 'demarcation' and 'tenitorialization' sepa-
rately and non-interchangeably. Demarcation refers to the draw-
ing of boundaries around forests that delineate them as state prop-
erty. The use of symbols such as fire-lines and boundary pillars 
that have been a featme of demarcation in Kullu serve as much to 
demarcate as to territorialize, as in allocation of property rights 
and detennination of resource-use patterns in forests . However, 
tenitorialization is much more than demarcation and entails a 
configuration of authority and power, through demarcation. 
31 
"Memorandum on the Forests of Kullu, Punjab, by D. 
Brandis, Inspector-General of Forests, on special duty, 
Ootacamund, the 20"' July 1882", Home Dept., Forests, Govt. of 
India, 1882, 
20 
The Government of India, taking a cue from Brandis's 
memo, reacted sharply to Punjab's decision to apply Chap-
ter IV instead of Chapter II. In August 1882, in a strongly 
worded letter, it asked the Government of Punjab to ex-
plain its actions. Quoting Brandis, it observed that "there 
is a doubt as to the accuracy of information placed before 
the Government of Punjab, on which the orders of 1" April 
1882 were based." Officiating Inspector General of For-
ests William Schlich was dispatched to Kullu to report on 
the ground situation.32 Schlich toured Kullu in October 
1882, accompanied by local revenue and forest officials. 
His report vindicated every claim made by the provincial 
government and its officers that the Government of India 
had objected to and Brandis had contested.33 In an effort to 
work out a compromise during his tour of inspection, he 
offered to reduce the extent of absolute reserves with no 
rights to eighty square miles-down from 156 suggested 
by Brandis and the 220 included in the original notifica-
tions.34 
It was at this point that Anderson took the Forest De-
partment aristocracy at the center completely head on. Tak-
ing issue with Brandis on his position that Reserved For-
ests with no rights were essential because of the adverse 
impact of grazing on the regeneration of deodar, Anderson 
quoted from an article on grazing that had appeared in the 
December 1882 issue of the Indian Forester, the mouth 
piece of the Forest Department. 
The result of excluding cattle from deodar forests, 
as far as natural reproduction goes, has not been at 
all satisfactory. As a rule, the result of excluding 
cattle after fellings have been made, is that a dense 
growth of grass and bushes of all kinds has sprung 
up, which, if it has not altogether prevented repro-
duction, has at all events, hindered a large number 
of seeds from reaching the ground, and has also 
probably choked many young seedlings before they 
had the time to overtop the grass.35 
This was a masterful move, as the author of the article 
was a forest officer and was referring to his observations 
from the vantage point of Jaunsar, the favorite example of 
32 A. Mackenzie, Secy to Govt. of India, to Junior Secy to 
Govt. of Punjab, no.707F, Home Dept. (Forests), Simla, 21" Au-
gust 1882, Kullu For. Con., HPSA, Shimla. 
33 A. Mackenzie, Secy to Govt. of India, to Junior Secy to 
Govt. of Punjab, no.666F, Home Dept. (Forests), Simla, 21" Au-
gust 1883, Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla. 
34 
"Note by J.B.Lyall, Esquire, Financial Commissioner, 
Punjab, regarding the treatment of the Forests in the Kullu part of 
the Kangra District", enclosme in F.C.Channing, Senior Secy to 
FC, Punjab, to Junior secy to Govt., Punjab, No.328, dated 12'" 
March 1883, Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla. 
35 A.Anderson, camp Gopipur, Dehra, to FC, Punjab, Demi-
official, dated 14'" March 1883, Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Simla. 
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Brandis.36 Anderson supported this thesis from his own 
observations in Kullu, reciting names of forests and vil-
lages where he had seen this happen and adding that "It 
maybe that the reproduction is in consequence of the graz-
ing, as Mr. Moir holds. But whether or not, it seems clear 
that the exc lusion of cattle from deodar forests is not the 
sine qua non to natural reproduction that it is said to be." 
Grazing was, and has been until today, the primary objec-
tion that the Forest Department had been raising against 
· demarcating the forests under Protected rather than Re-
served Forest status. The argument ran that it was not pos-
sible to close forests to grazing unless these were reserved 
and closed as in Jaunsar, and until that happened, there 
was no question of any regeneration . And here was Ander-
son, quoting a forest officer based in Jaunsar about how 
grazing was actually good for regeneration. 
With this one stroke of luck, as it were, Anderson cast 
senior forest officers, especially those with the Govern-
ment of India such as Brandis and Schlich, in very poor 
light and seized the initiative. The Government of Punjab 
compiled a powerful response to the report submitted by 
Schlich in November 1882. Enclosing memos from both 
Lyall and Anderson, Government of Punjab refuted every 
claim made by Schlich and rejected all proposals of a com-
promise.37 The Governor of Punjab summarily rejected the 
suggested reduction in reserves to eighty square miles and 
quoted from debates in the legislative council during the 
formulation of the Indian Forest Act in 1878, asserting that 
the lawmakers always meant the Protected Forests to be 
maintained permanently.38 In a similar vein, Anderson 
quoted Brandis from his memorandum on forest legisla-
tion of 1875, where he had argued about the difficulty of 
defining rights .39 Summoning all the evidence at his dis-
posal, the Governor launched a frontal assault on the Gov-
ernment of India in July 1883, attacking the authors of the 
Joint Report for misrepresenting their own recommenda-
tions and going beyond its limited scope. In summary, the 
letter suggested that "the real point for consideration is not 
whether proposals made in the Joint Report are to be ad-
hered to or departed from , but how a system of forest de-
marcation and conservancy suitable to the conditions of 
the district and the requirements of the case are best se-
cured ."40 
36 E. MeA. Moir, Deputy Conservator of Forests, Tons Divi-
sion, NWP, 'Cattle Grazing in Deodar Forests', Indian Forester, 
voLVIII no.3-4, December 1882, pp 274-277. 
37 H.C.Fanshawe, Offg. Junior Secy to Govt., Pu~jab and its 
Dependencies, to A. Mackenzie, Secy to the Govt. of India, Home 
Dept. (Forests), dated Lahore, 5"' July 1883, Kullu For. Corr., 
HPSA, Sllimla. 
38 ibid., Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla. 
39 A. Anderson, Forest Settlement ·Officer, Kullu, to C&S, 
Jullunder Div., No. l07, dated Dharmsala, 16"' January 1883, Kullu 
For. ColT., HPSA, Shimla. 
The compromise : Vertical territorialization 
Finally, as the dust settled on the war of the chapters, 
final orders were issued in April 1883, and Anderson com-
menced the task of demarcating forests . Moving towards a 
middle ground, these orders stipulated the formation of four 
classes of forests, more than anybody had suggested ear-
lier. The first of these was Reserved Forests under Chapter 
II. All remaining unoccupied and unclaimed land would 
be classified as Protected Forests, under Chapter IV of the 
Forest Act. These were further sub-divided into 1", 2"d, 
and 3'd classes. The 1" class would be those most valuable 
forests that could not be completely divested of rights or 
the ones that were too close to cultivation to be closed with 
any degree of success. As far as possible, it was proposed 
to "throw all rights in these forests" into the 2"d and 3'd 
classes. The 2"d class comprised afforests not immediately 
available for extraction owing to their inaccessibility, lack 
of good timber species , or being burdened with rights . Both 
these classes were to be demarcated with boundary pillars 
as markers and mapped. The remaining were clubbed to-
gether as 3'd class forests, neither demarcated nor mapped, 
but brought under the purview of the Forest Act and there-
fore state property. 41 
The classification in the new notification represented a 
compromise worked out at the local level between the For-
est and Revenue Departments. Anderson worked assidu-
ously, taking local forest officers along and demonstrating 
a will to work together. In forging a local consensus, he 
constantly harked back to the inappropriateness of the cen-
tral model, criticizing Brandis and slighting Schlich while 
at the same time asserting that "the policy of excluding 
valuable forest in order to acquire more extensive powers 
over the smaller area retained is quite unsuited to the cir-
cumstances ofKullu" while pointing out that "in this Colo-
nel Stenhouse and Mr. Smith, the local forest officers, agree 
with me."42 The rules prepared at the end of 1884 for Pro-
tected Forests of the first two classes were drafted jointly 
by Anderson and Smith, representing another level of con-
sensus . During the demarcation and recording of rights, 
Anderson remarked that the final outcome as a result of his 
settlement was far more extensive and much more strict in 
the allowance of rights than either Brandis's or Sch1ich 's 
had suggested. 43 
40 H.C.Fanshawe, Offg. Junior Secy to Govt. , Punjab and its 
Dependencies, to A. Mackenzie, Secy to the Govt. of Indi a, Home 
Dept. (Forests) , dated Lahore, S'h July 1883, Kullu For. Corr. , 
HPSA, Shimla. 
4 1 A.Anderson, Report on the Demarcation and settlement of 
the Kullu Forests, Lahore, Punjab Govt. Printing, 1886. 
42 A. Anderson, Forest Settlement Officer, Kullu, to C&S, 
Jullunder Div., No.l33, dated camp Hoshiarpur, 22"4 March 1884, 
Kullu For. Corr., HPSA, Shimla. 
43 ibid., pp 16-19. 
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The Forest Settlement Report, the first draft of which 
was submitted for approval in 1886, resulted in vertical 
territorialization that was a qualitative jump from the con-
trasting positions that it sprang from. It stood out for four 
distinguishing characteristics compared to the system pre-
vailing before. Firstly, it constituted a classification of for-
est classes that not only covered almost the entire forest 
territory but demarcated forests into vertically graded cat-
egories that progressively curtailed people's rights with 
respect to cultivation, fire, grazing and collection of forest 
produce-from 3'd class Undemarcated Forests to Reserved 
Forests. It put a large proportion of forests in 1" class pro-
tected forests, transferring rights therein to the 2"d and 3'd 
class forests. The report provided the following breakdown 
of the results of the demarcation: out of the total area of 
Kullu (1926 square miles), 1,240 were demarcated into ei-
ther reserved, 1 ",or 2"d class protected forests; of this 530 
was wooded territory, significantly in excess of the 400 
square miles estimated as forests in 1876, and 178 square 
miles were reserved as l ''class protected forests, more than 
twice the area offered by Schlich as a compromise in No-
vember 1882. Rights in 1" class forests were strictly re-
corded, as would have been the case for Reserved Forests. 
Sheep and goats were excluded from l" class forests, ex-
cept for a right of way in certain cases. Cultivation was 
prohibited in both the 1 '' and 2"d class forests, one of the 
pre-conditions for permanence and a prime complaint of 
Brandis, Schlich et al. More significantly, fu·e was also pro-
hibited in both classes, thus meeting another objection to 
the appropriateness of Protected Forests with respect to per-
manence. 
The second major feature of the settlement was the cre-
ation of a supra-tenure in the form of special regulations 
applied irrespective of their location. Thus, a list of 20 spe-
cies was proposed as reserved and restrictions were placed 
on their use over and above the restrictions on the forests 
where these occurred. These restrictions took the form of 
restricted timing of collection (for example, one week, twice 
a year for lopping of blue pine) or even the height to which 
certain trees could be lopped. It also resulted in a de facto 
freezing of rights in time, effectively preventing the acqui-
sition of new rights. Although a list of rights in every class 
of forest was prepared, every right allowed to be exercised 
in each 1" class forest was separately recorded "in order to 
enforce a penalty against any act not included in the list, 
and in that way prevent the springing up of new rights."44 
Even dry and fallen trees of deodar, walnut, box, and ash 
were not to be used by the rightholders. 
Thirdly, rights themselves were differentiated along 
ownership of land by linking property rights in forests with 
the payment of land revenue, effectively restricting the le-
gal rights to forests through a vertical differentiation of 
44 ibid., pp 19. 
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society. This had particularly serious repercussions on the 
non-cultivating population, divesting them of legitimacy 
in their claims on forests. Appending of forest rights to 
land revenue introduced a dimension in nature-society in-
teractions in Kullu that was a radical departure from pre-
. British customs. Access to forests in Kullu was umestricted 
for local populations, subject to rights of the King for hunt-
ing, snaring of hawks, and customary rights of nomadic 
pastoralists. Coupled with the injunction of acquisition on 
new rights, this vertical perspective on property rights ex-
acerbated social divisions and exploitative relations. 
Lastly, greater powers were assumed by the forest offi-
cials than ever before. Whereas earlier, the Negi or the head-
man was authorized to sanction up to 40 trees of the infe-
rior kind for house construction in almost all forests, the 
new settlement restricted this authority to 10 trees in the 
2"d and 3'd class forests and only for repairs . Only a Forest 
Officer had the power to sanction trees for new houses and 
as far as possible, these were to be given from 2"d and 3'd 
class forests. In addition, these trees were to be paid for at 
subsidized rates . It is important here to reiterate that the l" 
class forests were very close to cultivation and habitation, 
which was the reasoning put forward for the impossibility 
of demarcating them as reserved, and the 2"d class forests 
were mostly far from villages. With the shifting of rights 
from 1" class to 2"d class forests, in addition to the tempo-
ral restrictions on use of forest resources, the new rules 
were to have a profound impact on life in the Kullu valley. 
The Settlement Report, representing the new detente 
in the form of vertical territorialization, reflected the ca-
sual sanguinity of the bureaucracy in having surmounted 
troubling conflicts and establishing a rule of law over the 
forests. The general feeling was that "[t]he course of forest 
conservancy in the past has been a gradual imposing of 
such restrictions as experience showed to be necessary. The 
people have learnt to accept them, and a similar procedure 
in the future will, it is believed, be found satisfactory for 
the forests as well as the people."45 That was, alas, not to 
be. 
The irrelevance of legal categories and the futility of 
boundaries 
Anderson, in association with local forest officers, de-
marcated more than 1,200 square miles of state forests be-
tween 1883 and the middle of 1886. During this period, 
the barrage of correspondence relating to forest issues in 
Kullu slowed to a trickle, reflecting the consensus on the 
course of action. However, dissenting murmurs could be 
heard with the publication of the report and cracks in the 
detente began to appear by early 1887.46 
45 ibid., pp 7. 
46 
"Copy of a Note by the Hon'ble E.G.Wace, Financial Com-
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Fire 
Without waiting for the proposals to be sanctioned, 
which required these to go through the provincial govern-
ment to the Government of India, D.C. Johnstone, Assis-
tant Commissioner and 0. Down, Deputy Conservator of 
Forests implemented the new proposed rules and cracked 
down particularly on fire. There was a drought in the re-
gion, with rains failing in the summer of 1886 as well as 
1887, and there was much distress. The situation was com-
pounded when officials began enforcing the new rule re-
quiring permission of a forest officer before burning of 
grasslands. Johnstone, in sympathy with his colleagues in 
the Forest Department, believed "that the people often pur-
posely set fire to grasslands when their herds and flocks 
are badly off for fodder, on the principle that being fined is 
a lesser evil than having severe mortality of cattle and 
sheep." He solved his predicament with respect to the ad-
ministration of justice in the following manner : 
[T]he difficulty when no actual perpetrator is found, 
and where no clue is available as to whether the fire 
was accidental or not, is to know whether to treat 
the fire as one for which the zamindars should be 
held responsible . ... In most instances, I had to 
prosecute, for in these cases there was practically 
nothing to guide the judgment, and to let off one 
batch of zamindars would have involved letting off 
the whole in every such case.47 
During the single summer of 1887, Johnstone served 
sentences in 68 cases of fire in his court, amounting to a 
total fine of more than six thousand rupees48 and attracting 
a barrage of protests from local residents. Zamindars com-
plained to higher officials, particularly the Commissioner 
and Superintendent of J ullunder division and the Financial 
Commissioner of Punjab. Petitions continued throughout 
the summer and autumn of 1887, detailing the injustices 
perpetrated against the people.49 The petitions, many times 
authored by European settlers in the valley on behalf of the 
missioner, Punjab" in Report on the Forest Settlement of Kullu, 
Kangra Distiict, Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Forest 
Department, Apiil 1894, Nos.30-121, (henceforth For. Progs. Apru 
1894, HPSA, Shimla), No.32. 
47 
'Zamindar' was the generic name given to a land-revenue 
paying cultivator in Kullu. Literally translated, it meant 'the owner 
of land'. It should not be confused with the zamindars in Bengal 
and Central Provinces, who were large estate holders created by 
the British to facilitate the extraction of land revenue. 
48 
"Statement showing the total fires in Kullu Forests and 
other forest offences, with total fines inflicted in the court of As-
sistant Commissioner, Kullu", For. Progs. April 1894, HPSA, 
Shimla, No37. 
49 
"Translation of a petition by the Zainindars, oftehsil Plaich, 
in Kangra District, to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Punjab and the Financial Commissioner, Punjab", For. Progs. Apiil 
1894, HPSA, Shimla, No.40. 
local residents, also complained about the impracticality 
of the new rules regarding timber for house construction 
and expressed incredulity at being fined for collecting dead 
leaves from the forest. But most of all, the people were 
incensed at the enormity and unfairness of the fines. People 
complained that the figures of trees destroyed by fire that 
were quoted were completely false as the areas under ques-
tion were grasslands burnt every year and therefore had no 
trees . Even where forest fires erupted due to the exception-
ally dry weather, residents claimed that they did their best 
to put them out, but that these acts were ignored and the 
people were fined anyway.50 
It was also alleged that people were so distressed that 
there was an exodus from certain areas. Johnstone defended 
himself against the accusation of inciting a flight of people 
and asserted that "I do not believe that the fines were the 
cause of the departure of the poor zamindars .... A succes-
sion of bad harvests is the real reason, and not fines of a 
few annas per accused."51 Coming down on his side, Gor-
don Young, Commissioner of the Jullunder Division, 
blamed the lower functionaries of the Forest Department 
for overstating their case and being generally over-enthu-
siastic and defended Johnstone's punitive measures. 52 The 
Financial Commissioner was not amused. He severely rep-
rimanded Johnstone and ordered that the forests be divided 
into 'dangerous and non-dangerous zones' with respect to 
prospects of damage by fire and the restrictions on firing 
be removed in the non-dangerous zones.53 Such a redraw-
ing of boundaries was obviously anathema to the Forest 
Department; it would have undone the work of a decade at 
securing some sort of boundaries. But the Financial Com-
missioner would have none of it. In desperation, Col. Bailey, 
Conservator of Forests, Punjab, responded to the 
Commissioner's orders thus: 
[I]n the absence of anything like a demarcation and 
a map, mistakes, unintentional or intentional, and 
disputes will, I think, constantly arise . ... .I think 
the limits of the areas which may be burnt should 
be defined by blazed trees, temporary heaps of 
stones, marks cut into the turf, or in some such 
manner. The restriction of the burning to the sanc-
tioned areas is a matter of great importance, and I 
50 M.M.Carleton, to FC, Punjab, demi-official, dated 2Qtl• 
September 1887, For. Progs. Apiil 1894, HPSA, Shimla, No.44. 
51 
"Copy of Note, dated 1Qtl• October 1887, by D.C.Johnstone, 
Esquire, late Assistant Comissioner, Kullu", For. Progs. April 
1894, HPSA, Shimla, No. 46. 
52 Col. G.Gordon Young, C&S, Jullunder Div., to The Hon'ble 
Colonel E.G.Wace, FC, Punjab, For. Progs. Apii1 1894, HPSA, 
Shimla, No. 45. 
53 Senior Secy to FC, Punjab, to C&S, Jullunder Div. No.5964, 
dated 25tl' October 1887, For. Progs. Apiil 1894, HPSA, Shimla, 
No49. 
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consider that it is well worth while to take this 
amount of trouble in the matter. 54 
However, the problem was not merely of burning. There 
were heaps of complaints about restrictions on timber for 
house construction as well. The Forest Department, know-
ing fully well that the most valuable demarcated areas are 
adjacent to cu ltivation and habitation, was coming down 
heavily on trees felled on private lands on the plea that this 
was necessary to prevent encroachment on state property. 
Boundaries were being challenged on that front too, irre-
spective of where the fire lines were drawn. Just as bound-
aries to grazing were challenged earlier with respect to re-
generation of deodar against the convictions of forest of-
ficers, fire and timber were forcing the local administra-
tion to redraw boundaries at every stage, putting pressure 
on the already tenuous compromise and the consensus 
around the Anderson Settlement. 
In the end, local consensus broke down along familiar 
inter-departmental fault lines. Col Bailey, responding to 
the Commissioner's sympathies with the people, reverted 
to the "good for the people" argument. Referring to the 
forests of Kullu, he observed: 
I do not think that the state could ever hope to ob-
tain anything from them for export. All that they 
can do is to provide permanently (if this can by any 
means be secured) for a certain part of the wants of 
the people; and if the officers of the Forest Depart-
ment desire to see them protected in a manner suf-
ficient to attain this end, they do so primarily in the 
interests of the people themselves.55 
The new Conservator who replaced Bailey shortly, H.C. 
Hill, went back to the old debate regarding extensive de-
marcation as against intensive demarcation and concluded 
that it was most undesirable to have demarcated so much 
in the first place and suggested that the policy of a smaller 
area of strict reserves under Chapter II of the Indian Forest 
Act would have been better.56 The debate had come full 
circle indeed. 
Epilogue 
The story continued in Kullu and the redrawing of the 
boundaries never ceased. After the tumultuous events of 
1887, the Settlement Report was sent back for revision. It 
was resubmitted in 1892, leading to further discussion along 
54 CF, Punjab, to Secy to FC, Punjab, No.299, dated 27th 
November 1887, For. Progs. April 1894, HPSA, Shimla, No. 49. 
55 
"Note on Mr.Anderson's Kullu Settlement Report, by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bailey, Conservator of Forests, Punjab", For. 
Progs. April 1894, HPSA, Shimla, No.35. 
56 
"Copy of a Note by Mr.H.C.Jiill, Conservator of Forests, 
Punjab, Note C, Mr. Anderson's Report on Kullu Forest Settle-
ment", For. Progs. April 1894, HPSA, Shimla, No.3!. 
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similar lines. The rules and the record of rights in Kullu 
forests was finally accepted and notified by the Govern-
ment oflndia in June 1897.57 Major fires broke out in 1917, 
1921, and 1944.58 The Punjab Government set up a com-
mission ofenquiry in 1935 to report on the difficulties ex-
perienced by the people who live close to the forests as a 
result of the system of forest administration and suggest 
remedial measures.59 In the post-colonial period, restric-
tions were routinely relaxed on grazing; even Reserved 
Forests hitherto closed to livestock were opened to herds, 
in response to popular pressure now working through 
elected representatives of the people.60 The project of draw-
ing permanent boundaries around forests could not be ac-
complished in any real sense; it was forever being negoti-
ated. 
Concluding remarks 
Territorialization may be a project that is doomed to 
fail, but the study of its nuances in Kullu provides us with 
a few insights. Firstly, in the light of this evidence, the de-
bate on territorialization through legal categories may be 
viewed from a fresh perspective. In the discussions in In-
dia, the Forest Department has very often been cast as the 
villain of the piece, willful and scheming, encroaching on 
the rights of people. However, the roles could be recast in 
terms of the binary that worked itself out in Kullu-exten-
sive teiTitorialization, as in large areas with limited and 
progressively curtailed rights, versus intensive tenitorial-
ization, as in small and compact areas with summarily com-
muted rights. This binary takes us further in explaining the 
geographical and institutional diversity of outcomes in the 
territorialization project in colonial India, as witnessed in 
the widely divergent experiences in Punjab, Bengal, Canara, 
Madras, United Provinces, and Central Provinces. 
The experience of Kullu also troubles the assumption 
of territorialization through legal categories alone. As in-
ternal divisions frustrated attempts at demarcation of bound-
aries, the compromise of vertical territorialization can be 
seen as a less legal and more nuanced attempt at address-
ing the problem of boundaries . It would be pertinent to 
mention here that not only did the interpretation of legal 
categories extend the law substantively, but that at the same 
time it opened avenues for a gradual territorialization on 
the vertical dimension. The gradual and vertical progress 
of territorialization in Kullu is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it remains to be said that the vertically an·anged 
57 For. Progs. April 1894, HPSA, Shimla, Nos.65-67. 
58 G.Aggarwal, Fourth Working Plan for the Kullu and Seraj 
Forest Divisions, 1949-80, pp 67, Simla, Govt.Printing, 1957. 
59 G.C.Garbett, Report of the Punjab Government Forest 
Commission, Lahore, Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1938. 
60 Vasant Saberwal, 1999, op cit. 
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categories allowed for this possibility, going beyond the 
deadlock between Reserved and Protected Forests or be-
tween extensive and intensive territorialization. 
More specifically, the history of territorialization in 
Kullu, even for the brief period explored in this paper, al-
lows us to make better sense of the outcomes in 21" cen-
tury Kullu, as evidenced in the events in the Great Hima-
layan National Park. Arguing for Thailand, Vandergeest and 
Peluso contend that there is an inverse relationship between 
the success of territorialization and the number of institu-
tions that may legitimately enforce restrictions. "Where dif-
ferent legitimating authorities conflict in their allocation 
of rights, the one that is most enforceable in practice (de 
facto) will have a greater influence on behavior than de 
jure controls."61 This certainly seems to be true for Kullu 
in the late 19'11 century as well as late 20'11 century. Legiti-
macy emerged as the currency in Kullu in the 1880s, as 
forest officers were alienated for allegedly excessive re-
strictions. It may be pertinent to note here that the situation 
is not very different in the late 20' 11 century, with the rev-
enue department retaining its edge, and the addition of 
elected representatives to the list of "legitimating authori-
ties." The overriding de facto authority of elected repre-
sentatives in Kullu helped the people in rejecting there-
strictive legal bracketing of "rightholders" according to a 
narrow reading of the settlement records. The mirage of 
permanent boundaries around forests, in the face of failure 
to tenitorialize, has forced the Forest Department to in-
vent new dimensions of imagining territory and create dis-
courses for legitimacy. The third phase of teJTitorialization, 
through scientific categories such as National Parks, rep-
resents another attempt of the Forest Department to derive 
legitimacy for the unfinished project of territorialization. 
The struggle for legitimacy, so crucial to enforcement, 
is complicated by the presence of several actors at widely 
varied levels and operating on different scales. In Kullu, 
this matrix has worked itself into two inter-connected axes . 
The first, the tensions between central monopoly and local 
diversity, is played out and shifts between the local versus 
the provincial levels and the central versus provincial lev-
els at different times. The other axis, inter-departmental 
conflicts and rivalry, is never far from the surface but is 
occasionally buried in favor of local consensus. The two 
axes are constantly struggling for balance, seeking legiti-
macy, forever denied by the people to any actor for too 
long. In the context of territorialization, power is always 
being negotiated with respect to enforceability. In the. con-
text of the forests of Kullu, the ideal of permanent bound-
aries is doomed to failure, as challenges from below re-
garding the issues of grazing, fire, and timber for house 
construction force the state apparatus to renegotiate the 
61 Vandergeest and Peluso, pp 418. 
equilibrium of legitimacy and necessitate a redrawing of 
the boundaries. In this way, by the balancing of conflicting 
interests and a shifting fulcrum, territorialization in Kullu 
also helped the colonial state to emerge as an entity em-
bedded in society rather than separate from it and laid the 
foundations of the state-society relationship for the years 
to come. 
Abbreviations 
Fm: Progs. Apri/1894, OJOC, London: Report on the 
Forest Settlement of Kullu, Kangra District, Punjab Gov-
ernment, Revenue and Agriculture Department (RAD) (For-
ests), A Proceedings, Aprill894, Nos.30-121, Oriental and 
India Office Collections, British Library, London. 
Kullu Fm: Con:, HPSA, Shim/a : Printed Correspon-
dence afForests in Kullu, Basta #21, Serial #320, Kangra 
DC Records, Himachal Pradesh State Archives, Shimla. 
Agri. : Agriculture 
Asst. : Assistant 
Con: : Correspondence 
C&S: Commissioner and Superintendent 
CF : Conservator of Forests 
DCF : Deputy Conservator of Forests 
Dept.: Department 
Div. : Division 
FC : Financial Commissioner 
For. : Forests 
Govt. : Government 
Offg. : Officiating 
Progs. : Proceedings 
Rev. : Revenue 
Secy. : Secretary 
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